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Assessing the performance of conservation auctions:  






Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate 
the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating 
conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different 
countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more 
traditional fixed-price programs only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions 
quickly lose their edge. The budget-constrained auction performs similarly to the target-
constrained in the one-shot setting but appears more robust to repetition. Our results suggest 
that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic, and we 
propose a method for improving such estimates. 
   2
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There has been growing interest by governments in contracting with landholders for the 
provision of environmental goods and services in the countryside. Such contracts may be 
seen to create ‘quasi-markets’ in these goods in that farmers voluntarily enter into agreements 
to produce some predefined public environmental good in return for a payment. Examples 
include the US Water Quality Incentives Program, the English Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme, the German MEKA program, the French ‘La prime à l'herbe’, and the 
Environmental Services Scheme in New South Wales, Australia. Schemes are implemented 
at different geographical scales, from local to national, pursue different objectives and 
involve a wide range of management prescriptions.  
The increased importance of environmental contracting has, to date, not been reflected in 
innovative policy design or implementation. It remains the norm in most conservation 
programs to offer a single, fixed payment for compliance with a predetermined set of 
management prescriptions. One proposal that has been made to that effect is to allocate 
conservation contracts on the basis of competitive bidding, whereby farmers are asked to bid 
competitively for a limited number of conservation contracts. Such bidding mechanisms 
have, to date, been set up as discriminatory-price auctions where landholders are paid their 
own bid. In formulating their bids, they thus face a trade-off between a higher net gain from a 
higher bid and a reduced chance of winning. Producers facing competition are less likely to 
‘overbid’ relative to their true compliance costs. The expectation thus is that competitive 
bidding will reduce information rents and increase cost-effectiveness.  
The diffusion of auctions into the practice of conservation management has been slow, 
but interest in auctions for purchasing conservation services from landholders has recently 
grown. At a large scale, auctions have only been used in the Conservation Reserve Program 
(with a 2004 budget of $ 1.9 billion) and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (with   3
a 2004 budget of $0.9 billion) (Johansson, 2006; Babcock et al., 1996).. Interest in 
conservation auctions has recently increased throughout Australia, especially after the 
BushTender biodiversity trial auctions in Victoria (Stoneham et al., 2003). In the BushTender 
trials, conducted from 2001 to 2003, landholders were asked to bid for biodiversity 
conservation contracts. Currently, several additional auction trials are underway in Australia 
as part of the federal government’s market-based instrument (MBI) pilot program. In Europe, 
a conservation auction has been trialed in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The 
focus there has been on the maintenance of low-intensity grazing systems (Holm-Müller and 
Hilden, 2004). Auctions have also been used in the state of Georgia, USA, to buy back water 
abstraction licenses from farmers in order to preserve minimal in-stream flows in rivers for 
environmental or recreational purposes (Cummings et al., 2003). In Scotland, the Challenge 
Fund Scheme relied on an auction mechanism to encourage further afforestation on private 
land. Finally, contracts for the decommissioning of fishing vessels are usually allocated 
through competitive bidding: fishers are asked to nominate in a sealed-bid process the 
amount of compensation required for permanently removing their vessel from the fishery 
(Holland et al., 1999; Walden et al., 2003; Larkin et al., 2004). 
There is, to date, very little (and conflicting) evidence about the cost-effectiveness gains 
of auctions vis-à-vis fixed-payment programs. Stoneham et al. (2003) argue that the amount 
of biodiversity benefits acquired through the first round of BushTender auctions would have 
cost the government agency about seven times as much if a fixed-price program had been 
used instead. Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) simulate farmers’ bidding 
behaviour in a hypothetical conservation program and find cost-effectiveness gains ranging 
from 16 to 29%, depending on how the auction was implemented and how winners were 
selected. CJC Consultants (2004) report budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of 33 to 36% for 
the Scottish Challenge Fund Scheme. By contrast, White and Burton (2005) report gains   4
between 200 and 315% for the Auction of Landscape Recovery (ALR) pilot in Western 
Australia. Note that none of these studies, safe for that by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort (1997), measure auction performance against a theoretically rigorous benchmark 
of what we shall term “equivalent fixed payments”. The findings are thus sensitive to the 
assumed fixed prices used in the comparisons.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate the performance of conservation auctions vis-
à-vis a benchmark of “equivalent fixed payments”. This benchmark requires complete 
knowledge of the underlying opportunity costs of service provision and is therefore not 
available for empirical analyses of field trials or full scale implementation. The comparison 
was therefore made with the use of economic experiments where opportunity costs are 
perfectly controlled for and known to the experimenter. The experiments were carried out 
both at the University of Kiel, Germany, and at the University of Western Australia, Perth, 
Australia. Because conservation auctions come in two possible formats, as budget-
constrained (BC) or target-constrained (TC) auctions, we investigate whether this choice 
affects the performance of the auction relative to an equivalent fixed payment. In addition, 
since conservation contracts are usually offered in multiple bidding rounds, we further 
examine whether auction performance is affected by repetition. 
The remainder of the paper is organized a follows. Section two summarizes the role of 
controlled laboratory experiments in relation to existing theory for allocating conservation 
contracts. It also sets out a conceptual framework for comparing the performance of 
conservation auctions vis-à-vis “equivalent fixed payments”. Section three describes the 
economic experiments; section four provides and discusses the results. Section five draws 
conclusions for policy and highlights areas warranting further research    5
II. THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS FOR STUDYING CONSERVATION AUCTIONS 
The use of laboratory experiments to study auction outcomes originated in the 
fundamental complexity of the auction institution. Following Vickrey’s seminal work in 
1961, it was soon recognized that a large number of parameters influenced auction 
performance and that outcomes were very sensitive to the values of these parameters. These 
included, to name but a few, the distribution of information (private-value versus common-
value auctions), auction format (sealed-bid versus open call), and payment format (first-price 
versus second-price) (Klemperer, 1999, 2002, 2004; Milgrom, 1989). Theoretical 
investigations, which are constrained by analytical tractability, could only investigate the 
effect of one or a small number of parameters at a time, assuming all others constant. Major 
reviews of this literature include Cassady’s book (1967) and survey papers by Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1980), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Milgrom (1985, 1989), Wilson (1992), and 
Klemperer (1999). As a result, the theoretical literature on auctions remained divorced from 
the practical needs of auction implementation. This is well reviewed by Rothkopf and 
Harstad (1994) and Klemperer (2002).  
Economic experiments were called upon to bridge the gap between theory and practical 
implementation. Kagel’s review, in Kagel and Roth’s (1995) Handbook of Experimental 
Economics, remains a key reference for the contributions of the experimental effort up to that 
date. A forthcoming book, the Handbook of Experimental Economics Results  (Plott and 
Smith, 2008), will provide a very welcome update.  
The situation is exacerbated in the case of conservation auctions, as these are 
procurement, multiple-unit and usually repeated auctions. They are procurement auctions in 
that the auctioneer (the government agency) buys rather than sells environmental services. 
They are multiple-unit auctions in that landholders sell units of different quality 
(environmental services per unit area vary across the landscape), they can sell several units   6
each, and there is more than one winner. Conservation auctions are also repeated over time, 
as is the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auction which has been run as a multiple 
sign-up scheme (Riechelderfer and Boggess, 1988). Auction theory is less well developed for 
procurement than for direct auctions, for multiple-unit than for single-unit auctions, and for 
repeated than for one-shot auctions. The main reason, on which we shall not dwell here, is the 
level of complexity involved by the characteristics of conservation auctions.  
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) propose a bidding model which caters 
for this complexity. In their model, landholders’ bidding strategies are predicated on the 
belief that the conservation agency will decide on a maximum acceptable bid, or payment 
level. This is a common practice when the agency is subjected to a constrained budget. This 
maximum bid is determined ex post, after all bids have been received, as the last (highest) bid 
accepted within the available budget. The budget constraint thus is effectively modeled as a 
reserve price per unit of environmental service, unknown to bidders. Latacz-Lohmann and 
Van der Hamsvoort (1997) assume that bidders will form expectations about this reserve 
price and submit a bid that balances out net payoffs and probability of acceptance. The 
optimal bid is the one that maximizes the expected utility gain from the auction. They 
demonstrate that the optimal bidding strategy in a discriminatory-price auction is one of 
overbidding: the auction creates room for bidders to shade their bids above their costs of 
service provision and thereby to secure themselves an information rent. Overbidding is 
highest for the lowest-cost bidders, whereas the highest-cost bidders will bid closest to their 
true costs. To the best of our knowledge, Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort’s model 
is, to date, the only extension of auction theory which captures the particular features of 
conservation auctions. 
Given the lack of sufficient theoretical backdrop, conservation auctions have begun to be 
studied experimentally. This refers, strictly speaking, to controlled laboratory experiments,   7
but can also be understood in a broader sense to mean the sequential combination of 
laboratory experiments and small-scale field trials. This was done in Australia in connection 
with the BushTender trials in the state of Victoria. Here certain design problems, in particular 
the amount and choice of the information to be communicated to landholders before the 
bidding session, was investigated experimentally (Cason et al., 2003). In the State of Georgia, 
USA, auctions for buying back water abstraction licenses from irrigators in times of drought 
were not implemented before a number of controlled laboratory experiments had been carried 
out (Laury, 2002). Cason and Gangadharan (2005) report the results of an economic 
experiment to investigate the outcome properties of uniform versus discriminatory-price 
auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. They find that although overbidding was 
more pronounced in the discriminatory-price auction, the discriminatory format had superior 
overall market performance.  
The present paper contributes to the experimental effort in the field of conservation 
auctions. In contrast to previous studies, which have investigated the outcome properties of 
alternative auction design options, the focus of this paper is on comparing the auction (as an 
institution) to the more traditional system of centrally decided fixed-rate payments.  
Such comparisons can be made against either a fixed budget or a fixed target. In the first 
case, the budget is given and known; the risk is whether the target will be achieved. We term 
this the budget-constrained (BC) auction. In the second case, the target to be achieved is 
given and known; the risk is with what it might end up costing. This we call the target-
constrained (TC) auction. For each of the two auction formats we define an equivalent fixed 
payment. For the BC auction, this is the minimum uniform payment rate that would have 
resulted in the same total expenditure as the auction. In the TC case, the corresponding 
uniform payment is computed as the minimum uniform payment that would have been 
needed to achieve the same outcome as the auction. It should be clear that, since this requires   8
the knowledge of the underlying opportunity cost (OC) curve, it is only possible in an 
experimental setting, not in a policy setting.  
Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework for assessing the performance of 
discriminatory price auctions. Consider first the BC auction (Frame A) and the corresponding 
fixed-price program. It is important to understand that the opportunity cost curve 
(representing the landholders’ true costs of service provision) is the relevant supply curve 
when a fixed payment is offered. Then all landholders with opportunity costs below the fixed 
payment stand to gain from participation. The marginal participant is the one whose 
opportunity cost is equal to the payment rate offered. Thus, with a fixed payment rate pF, XF 
units of service will be traded. The total budget cost is represented by area OECXF. Under a 
discriminatory-price auction, by contrast, the ordered bids (not the opportunity cost curve) 
represent the supply curve. The auction creates room for bidders to shade their bids above 
their true opportunity costs and thereby to secure themselves an information rent, as predicted 
by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort’s (1997) model. Bidders are accepted in the 
order of their bids until the budget is exhausted. The total budget cost is represented by area 
OABXD. Assuming the same budget as under the fixed-price program (i.e. area OABXD = 
area OECXF), XD units of service can be bought – more than under the fixed-price program.  
Figure 1 about here 
Frame B of Figure 1 illustrates the equivalent framework for TC auctions. Here the units 
of service to be purchased (rather than the budget) are set, say at XD in Frame B. An auction 
is held to acquire XD units. The resultant budget outlay is reflected by area OABXD. To 
assess auction performance, one must determine the equivalent fixed payment that would 
have yielded the same outcome as the auction, i.e. XF = XD. To do this, we set the price such 
that it intersects the OC curve at the level of the target. This price is shown as pF in Frame B. 
The corresponding budget outlay is reflected by area OECXF. Frame B has been drawn such   9
that the auction buys the same quantity of environmental benefits at a lower budgetary cost 
(area OABXD) as the equivalent fixed-price program (area OECXF). The auction thus turns 
out to be the more cost-effective mechanism.
1  
The cost-effectiveness of the auction thus depends upon the degree of bid shading. One 
would normally expect bid shading to be low and the auction to be superior to the fixed-price 
program (as shown in the figures). However, if bidders have learned the bid caps from 
previous auction rounds, bid shading can be significant, resulting in poor auction 
performance.  
 
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The purpose of the experiments described below was to compare the performance of two 
auction formats, the budget-constrained (BC) and the target-constrained (TC) auctions, 
against the benchmark of a budget-equivalent and an outcome-equivalent fixed-price 
program. We thus use two benchmarks, one for each auction format. Both auctions were 
designed as discriminatory-price tenders, which pay successful bidders their bid.  
 
Setup common to both auction formats 
Both auction formats were submitted to a common experimental testing. They were first 
carried out at the University of Kiel, Germany, in January of 2004, then, in October, at the 
University of Western Australia in Perth, Australia. The Perth experiment replicated the Kiel 
experiment, in order to check for the robustness of results.  
The Kiel experiment was carried out with first-year students in agricultural economics. 
The total number of students was about 88 (the number varied slightly across sessions). They 
were divided into two groups, one for each of the two auction formats. The auction setup   10
referred to reductions in nitrogen fertilizer on a wheat crop, in order to meet EU regulations 
regarding limits to nitrate concentration in groundwater (50 mg/liter). This is a serious 
concern in rural areas of northern Germany, and one which students in Kiel would be aware 
of and sensitive to. Participants were offered would-be contracts for committing themselves 
to reduce applications of nitrogen fertilizer from their currently most profitable level down to 
a predefined constrained level, equal to 80 kg per hectare. Each participant was given a 
different production function for nitrogen fertilizer in wheat production and thus faced a 
different opportunity cost resulting from the adoption of the nitrogen reduction program. 
Opportunity (or participation) costs were spread uniformly between €5 (the lowest-cost 
farmer) and €264 (the highest-cost farmer). The cost range was not given, but bidders were 
told that costs were uniformly distributed. Bidders knew their own opportunity costs but not 
those of rival bidders. They were given a rough estimate of where he or she stood compared 
to rival bidders in terms of opportunity costs. This was done by informing bidders in which 
cost quartile they belonged: upper quarter, upper half, lower half, lower quarter.
2 It was 
assumed that bidders could look around and estimate the number of competitors in their 
group: between 40 and 44 depending on sessions in the Kiel experiment, and 27 in the Perth 
experiment. 
Participants were told that not all of them would be able to win contracts and that they 
were therefore competing against each other. To keep things very simple, each participant 
could put up just one land unit of wheat, the same area for all participants. They were told 
that if they won a contract, they would be paid the difference between their bid and their 
opportunity cost.  
For both groups, three rounds were held in order to investigate the performance of the 
auctions with repetition. That is, which of the two auction formats was better able to maintain 
a good performance as bidders get to “play the game” several times? In rounds two and three,   11
exactly the same setup was used, except that bidders knew of their own result in the previous 
round(s), and successful bidders had been paid their net gains at the end of each round. For 
equity reasons without which repetitions could not have been held, opportunity costs were 
reshuffled between rounds. That is, we ensured that those who had been in the third or fourth 
cost quartiles were at least once in the first or second quartile. Otherwise, some participants 
would always have been low-cost bidders while others would always have been high-cost, 
thereby less likely to be selected. This would have resulted in refusal to participate, thus 
making the experiment impossible.  
 
Auction specific setup  
The two auction formats differed mainly with respect to the information given to, and 
asked of, the bidders. Since auctions are very sensitive to information structure, it was 
important to perfectly control for this aspect.  
BC auction specifics: In the first round, the group playing the BC auction was informed 
of the available budget for the current session. The budget constraint announced (€3900) was 
clearly distinguished from the actual payments made at the end of the session.
3 Actual bidder 
payments were proportional to their gains calculated as own bid minus participation cost. 
Bidders were then asked to state their bid. In the following two rounds, bidders also knew 
whether they had previously been successful or not, and if so, what their net gains were. No 
information regarding other bidders was given, as e.g. the number of winners.  
TC auction specifics: To the TC auction group, instead of a budget constraint, the number 
of contracts to be allocated was announced. This number had to be worked out immediately 
after the BC auction had been held, because the target was set equal to the number of 
contracts allocated with the €3900 budget constraint. This was done in order to be able to 
compare the two auction formats on an equal footing. In the first round, the BC auction   12
yielded 29 contracts. Thus the number 29 was announced to the TC auction group. The 
information treatment was identical to the BC auction. Importantly, during the first session, 
the two groups were not allowed to communicate. The TC group entered the experimental 
venue as the BC group exited by an opposite door. Tutors were present to make sure no 
communication happened. Participants were then asked to state the amount bid for a contract.  
 
The Perth replicate  
The Perth experiment was in all points identical to the Kiel experiment, save for the 
following logistical details. Participants were mostly second-year students, with a few third 
and fourth years as well as a handful of post-graduates – all in the area of agriculture or 
natural resource management. They totaled about 53 in number, with a variation of one or 
two between sessions, split about evenly between the BC and TC groups. To reflect the 
smaller number of participants in the Perth experiment, the budget constraint was lowered 
proportionately, compared to the Kiel experiment ($2300).  
A slight difference in the Perth experiment was the twist given to the story. Rather than 
nitrogen leaching into the groundwater, the government agency was buying back from 
horticulturalists in the Swan catchment (around Perth) a composite good made of nitrogen 
and phosphorus, and the problem was eutrophication in the Swan river following excess 
runoff of these two nutrients – a socially and politically sensitive issue in Perth.   
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Organizing the results: performance criteria and dimensions for comparison 
Analyzing auction performance is a multi-dimensional task. More than one performance 
criterion can be used, and comparisons need to be made along several dimensions. In 
evaluating auction performance, three criteria are standard: budgetary cost-effectiveness,   13
information rents, and economic efficiency. The first is measured as the payment per kg of 
nitrogen (N) abated; it measures the value-for-money a government agency achieves with 
taxpayers’ money. The second is measured as the payments made over and above 
participation costs. The third, economic efficiency, collapses in this case to forgone profits, 
that is, the participation or opportunity cost (OC) per kg of N abated, which measures the cost 
to society of achieving a unit of N abatement. This criterion would thus better be 
characterized as economic cost-effectiveness, to the extent that the benefits of N abatement 
were not directly considered; however, we shall refer to it as economic efficiency since this is 
the intended performance criterion.  
The first dimension of comparison confronts the auction to an equivalent fixed-rate 
payment (FRP). As highlighted in section 2, the latter is not arbitrary. In the BC auction, it is 
the minimum uniform payment rate (MUP) that would have resulted in the same budgetary 
expenditure as the auction. In the TC auction, it is the minimum uniform payment that would 
have been needed to achieve the same outcome as the auction. It is important to understand 
that the MUP benchmark is defined as the FRP to the lowest-cost participants up to the 
budget or target constraint. That is, landholders are accepted into the program starting from 
the lowest opportunity costs (OC) until the budget is exhausted or the target is achieved. The 
MUP thus represents the lowest possible FRP subject to the budget or target constraint. This 
provides a least-cost uniform pay rate, a theoretical but ‘absolute’ benchmark for comparison. 
Of course, it can only be used with controlled laboratory experiments where individual OC 
are known with certainty.  
In practice, policy makers will not have this information, and the MUP will thus not be a 
realistic benchmark for policy settings. It is more realistic to assume that policy makers and 
administrators will have some information about the average OC of participation as an 
anchoring point or benchmark for choosing the payment rate. In the subsequent analysis, we   14
shall refer to this benchmark as the ‘average cost payment’ benchmark (ACP) as opposed to 
the more theoretical MUP.  
Besides comparing auction performance to the MUP and ACP benchmarks, we will track 
performance criteria as fixed payment rates are varied systematically, from lowest to highest. 
This is of interest because all real fixed-payment rates are to some extent arbitrary if the 
regulator has only very limited information about landholders’ compliance costs. It is 
therefore informative to see how performance criteria vary as a function of the level of 
payment. The relative performance of the auction can also be positioned on the spectrum of 
fixed-rate payments. This is done by dividing the total payment made by the number of 
successful bidders.  
A second dimension of comparison confronts the two conservation auction formats, the 
BC and TC auctions. Although to date mainly BC auctions have been used in public 
conservation programs, governments may wish to know how each format performs relative to 
a FRP in this context.  
A third dimension compares different rounds in a repeated auction. An equivalent FRP 
program is computed for each round to see how the performance of the auction relative to the 
FRP evolves over repetitions. This is to study the robustness of auctions to potential bidder 
learning of the cut-off bids, as was demonstrated by the CRP during the late 1980s.  
Finally, a fourth dimension involves comparing the Kiel and the Perth experiments. This 
provides information on the robustness and credibility of the results. If the experiments have 
been implemented in rigorously similar manner, then results should be similar in both cases; 
if not, some uncontrolled factor is at work and better controlled experimentation is needed 
before any conclusions can be drawn from the results.  
We shall now examine how auctions perform relative to FRP programs using the three 
above criteria and the analytical template presented above. The focus of this paper being on   15
the first of the four dimensions, the other three will be considered as modifying factors, 
capable of impacting on the relative performance of auctions.  
 
Auctions versus FRP programs (without repetition)   
Table 1 presents the results so as to allow a direct assessment of auction performance 
relative to our two chosen FRP benchmarks: auction performance appears as 100% (of itself) 
while the MUP and ACP benchmarks are expressed in terms of the auction. The underlying 
raw data generated by the experiments is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. Note that in 
the BC setting the budget is held constant when comparing the auction to the two FRP 
benchmarks, while in the TC setting the number of contracts awarded is held constant. The 
performance criteria appear in the three bottom rows in both the Kiel and the Perth tables. 
The rows above provide the underlying values that help to interpret the results.  
Table 1 about here 
Starting with budgetary cost-effectiveness as measured by the payment per kg N abated, 
Table 1 shows that in all cases the auction outperforms fixed-price programs, even the MUP. 
Relative to the MUP, this advantage ranges from 11 to 32 per cent, that is, one unit of 
abatement paid at a fixed rate would have cost 11 to 32 per cent more than the auction. 
Relative to the more policy relevant ACP benchmark, the range is, as one would expect, 
greater. This performance advantage of the auction also holds in terms of information rents, 
indicated in Table 1 by the ratio of total payments to opportunity costs. Again, the advantage 
of the auction is greater relative to the ACP than to the MUP. In a one-shot auction setting, 
discriminatory-price bidding thus achieves a unit of abatement at least cost and minimizes the 
degree of overcompensation relative to the two FRP benchmarks and indeed, as we shall 
demonstrate below, relative to all possible FRPs.    16
In terms of economic efficiency, recall that the MUP by definition minimizes the 
opportunity cost per kg N abated. This is because landholders are accepted into the program 
starting from the lowest opportunity costs (OC) until the budget is exhausted or the target is 
achieved. Therefore, the best that an auction could do is to equal the MUP, which is the case 
in the Perth TC treatment. In the three other treatments, the MUP is up to 18 per cent more 
efficient than the auction; that is, the cost to society of a unit of N abatement is up to 18% 
higher. On the other hand, relative to the ACP benchmark, results are more mixed: in the Kiel 
experiment, the auction turns out to be slightly less efficient than the ACP, while the opposite 
holds for the Perth replicate. Relative to the ACP, the BC auction attracts a greater number of 
winners, namely those with higher OC, thus raising the average OC per kg of N abated. In 
the TC treatment, the explanation is less intuitive: the auction, through sufficient bid-shading, 
creates room for higher-cost participants to get selected. By contrast, in the ACP program, 
only those participants whose OC is less than the ACP will be awarded a contract. When 
economic efficiency is the driving policy motivation, the advantage of the auction relative to 
an equivalent fixed-price program based on [an estimate of] the average OC will be far less 
obvious than if budgetary cost-effectiveness was the main motivation.  
Figure 2 shows the positioning of the Kiel auction in the first round relative to the ACP, 
the MUP, and the whole range of FRPs from the average payment resulting from the auction 
up to the payment that would attract the last (highest-cost) bidder into the program. The 
corresponding graphs for the Perth experiment have been omitted since findings are very 
similar. The average payment made under the auction is shown in Figure 2 by the vertical 
line labeled “auction”. It was included on the FRP rates axis in order to visualize its relative 
positioning according to the three performance criteria, even though it conceals a greater 
number of winners in the BC setting and a smaller total payment in the TC setting. All FRP 
rates to the left of the MUP are not sufficiently high to attract a large enough number of   17
participants either to achieve the target (TC setting) or to exhaust the budget (BC setting). 
Therefore, FRP rates below MUP cannot define an auction-equivalent FRP program. 
Consequently, if an auction outperforms the MUP, it will outperform any other equivalent 
FRP to the right of MUP. In Figure 2, both auction formats consistently outperform the MUP 
in terms of budgetary cost-effectiveness and information rents, and therefore, of course, the 
ACP or indeed any other FRP. On the other hand, for reasons explained above, the auction at 
best equals the MUP in terms of economic efficiency.  
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
If we examine the impact of varying fixed-rate payments on the three performance 
criteria, several facts stand out. First, higher FRP rates deteriorate budgetary cost-
effectiveness, as one might have expected. What may appear as less expected is that both 
economic efficiency and the extent of information rents do not necessarily increase 
monotonically with FRP rates. In some cases they do not show any tendency to either 
decrease or increase. This can be understood by recalling that higher FRP rates attract higher-
cost landholders, who also abate an increasing amount of N per hectare. Because OC per 
hectare and N abatement per hectare increase at similar rates, the ratio of OC to N abated 
remains roughly unchanged when FRP rates increase. This reflects of course the nature of the 
underlying production functions (see section 3).  
 
Factors that can affect how an auction compares to a FRP program  
Table 2 gives the performance of the two FRP benchmarks relative to the equivalent 
discriminatory-price auction (TC or BC). They measure the ratios, in terms of our three 
criteria, of MUP and ACP performance relative to the auction which is understood to be set 
everywhere at 100. A number greater than 100 means that the auction performs better than its 
equivalent FRP program, and the greater of two numbers (whether above or below 100)   18
means that the auction corresponding to the greater number performs better compared to its 
equivalent FRP than the other auction does relative to its own FRP.  
Table 2 about here 
First, does the format of an auction affect its relative advantage over a FRP program? In 
terms of economic efficiency, Table 2 clearly shows that the TC auction consistently 
outperforms BC relative to both fixed-price benchmarks. This, however, should not come as a 
surprise: the TC format will, by construction, always be superior to the BC format. This is 
because the TC constrains the number of winning bidders to be fixed, whereas under the BC 
format, compared to an equivalent FRP, the number of winners is allowed to increase up to 
the budget limit. This will result in higher-cost participants to be awarded a contract, thus 
raising the average OC per kg of N abated.  
In terms of budgetary cost-effectiveness, the TC format outperforms the BC only relative 
to the MUP benchmark in both the Kiel experiment and the Perth replicate. Relative to the 
ACP, results are inconclusive: in the experimental setting, they depend on bidders’ cost 
profiles; in the field, they depend on the regulator’s choice of the FRP.  
In terms of information rents, results are mixed. Seen from the benchmark angle, TC 
outperforms BC relative to the MUP in terms of two criteria, economic efficiency and 
budgetary cost-effectiveness. The ACP benchmark does not yield any consistent story: it will 
depend on the cost profile of participants – e.g. how far apart the average and the median cost 
are. From a policy perspective, an ACP is the only practical benchmark, and auction format 
will matter only if economic efficiency is the driving motivation. This result holds, of course, 
only in terms of auction performance relative to a fixed-price program.  
Second, let us consider the effect of repetition on auction performance. We are interested 
in two aspects: the advantage of the auction relative to its fixed-payment benchmark, and the 
advantage of one auction format relative to the other. If we contrast the outcomes of round 1   19
and 3 in Table 2 (round 2 mostly having values between rounds 1 and 3), we observe that 
except in the case of the Perth -BC 3 auction, both auction formats have lost their edge to the 
MUP. In the third round, the first-round results are mostly overturned. The TC auction has 
lost its advantage even to the ACP. This confirms and refines the results by Hailu and 
Schilizzi (2004) who interpret this result in terms of bidder learning. Thus, with repetition, an 
auction loses its performance advantages over FRP programs; but the effect is only clear-cut 
in the TC case, where the auction clearly performs least well in terms of equivalent fixed-
payment rates. In the BC case, this effect remains ambiguous, if at all present. While the BC 
auction clearly performs less well in round 3 than in round 1, it maintains its advantage over 
its FRP benchmarks. This suggests that the auction is more robust to repetition under the BC 
setting than under the TC setting, a result of potential relevance to policy.  
While with repetition the TC loses relative advantage over the BC auction in terms of 
budgetary cost-effectiveness and information rents, this appears not to be the case when 
economic efficiency is considered: from Table 2, it appears that economic efficiency 
maintains the relative advantage of TC over BC, although the difference has been 
diminishing.  
If we now examine payments in absolute rather than relative terms, by comparing 
corresponding graphs in Figures 2 and 3, we observe that, in both the BC and TC settings, the 
average auction payment rate increases in all cases: from €133 to €159, or by 20%, in the BC 
auction, and from €147 to €193, or by 31%, in the TC setting. This confirms the greater 
robustness of the BC auction under repetition. 
Third, Table 2 shows that the relative advantage of both auction types relative to their 
corresponding FRPs is slightly but systematically greater in the Perth replicate than in the 
Kiel experiment. This would have been a concern for the robustness of the results had the 
populations of bidders in both experiments been rigorously identical. Instead, as mentioned in   20
section 3, the two populations differed in their risk attitudes, as measured by a standard 
certainty-equivalence test.
4 We hypothesize that a risk-aversion adjusted set of bids would 
reduce the differences between the two replicates and allow a meaningful comparison – a 
topic we leave for future work.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of results  
The purpose of this work was to investigate to what extent discriminatory-price auctions 
perform better than equivalent fixed-price programs. The comparison was made using three 
performance criteria: budgetary cost-effectiveness, information rents, and economic 
efficiency. Given insufficient theoretical guidance from the literature, this was done by means 
of controlled economic experiments. Two possible auction formats were compared, 
depending on whether the policy tries to achieve the maximum outcome with a given budget 
(budget-constrained auction) or minimizes its budgetary outlay for a predetermined outcome 
level (target-constrained auction). Relative auction performance was submitted to repetition 
to see if potential bidder learning might affect the results. These were further submitted to 
replication in two different countries to check for their robustness.  
Some clear conclusions emerge from this study. The first is that both target- and budget-
constrained auctions perform better than any possible fixed-price program in a one-shot 
setting, where bidders have had no opportunity to learn from previous results. This holds for 
all three performance criteria, except when economic efficiency is measured relative to the 
minimum uniform fixed-payment program (MUP) which, by construction, yields the lowest 
possible cost profile.  
The second conclusion is that repetition erodes the advantage of auctions relative to 
fixed-price programs, making it easily possible for an auction to be outperformed by an   21
equivalent fixed-rate program. Given that this effect was clearly visible in the third round in 
both replicates, we may conclude that auctions repeated identically and ceteris paribus erode 
their performance edge rather quickly.  
The third issue was whether, in the context of multiple-unit, discriminatory-price 
conservation auctions, format matters. The third conclusion here is that under the one-shot 
setting, the two auction formats appear roughly equivalent; but the BC format is clearly more 
robust to repetition than the TC. Since conservation auctions tend to be repeated over time, 
the greater robustness of the BC auction is the result of potential relevance to policy.  
The first two conclusions seem to be robust, in that both Kiel and Perth replicates yield 
comparable outcomes, although the auction’s advantages comes out slightly greater in the 
Perth replicate than in the Kiel experiment. We attribute this difference to different 
behavioral profiles of the two bidder populations.   
 
Policy implications 
The recent surge of interest in conservation auctions has been driven by evaluation results 
from pilots carried out across Australia since 2001. Stoneham et al. (2003) forcefully 
demonstrated, using data from the BushTender pilots in Victoria, the superiority of 
competitive bidding as a contract allocation mechanism. They found that the amount of 
biodiversity benefits acquired through the first round of BushTender auctions would have 
cost about seven times as much if a fixed-price program had been used instead. The results 
from the present study suggest that the gains from auctions relative to an equivalent fixed-
price program are not nearly as high. In a one-shot auction, gains are more likely to be in the 
range of 10 to 60 per cent than 200 to 700 per cent. With repetition, gains are quickly eroded 
to the extent that the auction may be outperformed by a fixed-price program, as Hailu and 
Schilizzi (2004) have already highlighted. Our performance figures compare well to the 33 to   22
36 per cent cost-effectiveness gains reported for the Scottish Challenge Funds (CJC 
Consultants, 2004), although these figures were not derived in comparison with equivalent 
fixed prices.  
It is important to note, however, that the magnitude of these numbers depends upon the 
nature of the environmental problem at hand. In our case, production functions were used to 
derive, for each individual landholder, opportunity costs and simulate reduction in fertilizer 
use and nutrient leaching. Different coefficients or functional forms would have resulted in 
different bid levels, abatement benefits, and thus different auction performance. It is thus 
conceivable, though highly unlikely, that the physical and economic structure underlying the 
BushTender pilot might be such that the very high cost-effectiveness gains reported by 
Stoneham et al. (2003) might have been possible.  
Our results confirm the experience gained from the US Conservation Reserve Program: 
when bidders have the opportunity to learn from preceding bidding rounds, they will use that 
information to update their bids and reap higher rents – at the detriment of auction 
performance. The implication for the policy maker is that auctions will in general perform 
better than equivalent fixed-payment programs only in one-shot settings. If, however, the 
auction is to be repeated several times, which would indeed be the case with most 
conservation programs, then one may hypothesize that changing one or more parameters of 
the auction would mitigate the erosion of the auction’s advantage; for example, by 
announcing different explicit reserve prices or changing the budget or the target level. The 
extent to which this would be true, however, is yet to be researched.  
The choice of auction format, BC or TC, does not seem to matter very much in the one-
shot setting, unless economic efficiency is the driving policy motivation. In this case, it was 
shown that the TC format would, by construction, perform better than an equivalent fixed-
price program. Policy makers, however, usually place more weight on budgetary cost-  23
effectiveness and information rents than on economic efficiency. Our findings suggest that, 
with repetition, the TC loses its relative advantage over the BC auction in terms of budgetary 
cost-effectiveness and information rents. This makes the BC the more appropriate format for 
multiple-signup conservation programs. These results again highlight the importance of 
experimental studies for informing the design of conservation auctions in the field.  
 
Limitations and further research 
The confrontation of our experimental study with ex-post empirical evaluations of field 
trials has highlighted the extreme importance, indeed the absolute necessity, of controlled 
laboratory experiments for measuring the performance of auctions relative to equivalent 
fixed-price programs. The challenge facing authors like Stoneham et al. (2003) is that they 
have attempted an impossible task: to measure the performance of a discriminatory-price 
auction without knowledge of the bidders’ underlying opportunity costs. It should be clear 
from the present study that this cannot be done. This raises the question of whether ex-ante 
auction experiments, carried out in controlled laboratory conditions, might be able to help 
with such ex-post evaluations. This seems to be as yet an unresearched problem.  
One of the goals of this study was to check the reliability of the experimental results by 
showing that between the two replicates, carried out in two different countries, there were no 
systematic differences. Instead, slight though systematic differences were found, which were 
traced back to differences in risk attitudes between bidder populations. This highlighted the 
fact that the null hypothesis, whereby no differences between the replicates should be 
observed, relied on the assumption that all bidders in both populations were risk-neutral (or at 
least had the same risk attitudes), a standard assumption in the auction theory literature. To 
allow a meaningful comparison between the replicates, bids would need to be adjusted for 
different risk attitudes. This is a topic for another study which, although important from a   24
theoretical perspective, remains marginal for the purposes of the present paper, and will 
therefore be left for future work.   
This study has focused on the performance of BC and TC auctions relative to equivalent 
fixed-price programs; the results cannot be extrapolated to how each auction compares, in 
absolute terms, relative to each other. This study has highlighted the fact that they obey two 
rather different rationales, reflecting different information structures for bidders. More work 
is needed to fully understand the theoretical and the policy implications of this difference. 
Research is also needed to explore how sensitive the preference between the two auction 
formats might be for such things as the degree of heterogeneity of bidders’ opportunity costs, 
cost efficiency of production, or scale of operation.  
Caution is called for in extrapolating the results of this study given that it is likely that 
they will to some extent depend upon the underlying production functions and cost structures. 
Further research is warranted to explore this dependence in a systematic manner.  
____________________________________________________ 
NOTES 
1 This can be seen by observing that area KBC is smaller than area AEK.  
2 The experimental protocol may be obtained from the authors upon request.  
3 This budget constraint of 3900€ was in “nominal” lab euros, which reflected the production functions 
underlying the costs imposed by reduced nitrogen applications. This was clearly distinguished from the limited 
funds available for each session of the experiment (300€). Salience was preserved through the fixed 
proportionality rate between gains in nominal lab euros and payments in hard currency.  
4 The Kiel population of students was found to be slightly risk-taking (CE = 107), whereas the Perth population 
of students was found to be risk-averse (CE = 88); a perfectly risk-neutral population would have a CE of 100.  
   25
References 
 
Babcock, B., Lakshminarayan, P.G., Wu, J. and Zilberman, D. 1996. “The economics of a 
public fund for environmental amenities: a study of CRP contracts.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 78: 961-971.  
Cason, T., Gangadharan L. and Duke C. 2003. “A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-
point source pollution.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46: 446-471.  
Cason, T. and Gangadharan, L. 2005. “A laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative 
price auctions for reducing non-point source pollution.” Land Economics 81 (1): 51-70. 
Cassady, R. Jr. 1967. Auctions and Auctioneering, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.  
CJC Consulting 2004. “Economic Evaluation of the Central Scotland Forest and Grampian 
Challenge Funds.” Final report for Forestry Commission Scotland. 
www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/ FCchallenge.pdf/$FILE/FCchallenge.pdf (accessed May 
2006).  
Cummings, R., Holt, C. and Laury, S. 2003. “Using laboratory experiments for policy-making: an 
example from the Georgia irrigation reduction auction.” Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies Working Paper # 06-14. Georgia State University. 
http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/2006/downloads/Laury_GeorgiaIrrigationAuction.pdf 
(accessed May 2006). 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. 1980. “Auctions and bidding models.” Management Science 26: 119-21.  
Hailu, A. and Schilizzi, S. 2004. “Are auctions more efficient than fixed price schemes when 
bidders learn?” Australian Journal of Management 29 (2): 147-168.  
Holland, D., Gudmundsson, E. and J. Gates, 1999. “Do Fishing Vessel Buyback Programs 
Work: a Survey of the Evidence.” Marine Policy 23 (1): 47-69.  
Johansson, R. 2006. “Participant Bidding Enhances Cost Effectiveness”. USDA ERS 
Economic Brief Number 3, 6pp. www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/EB3/. Last accessed 
September 16, 2006.  
Holm-Müller, K. and Hilden, R. 2004. Ausschreibung von Agrarumweltprogrammen am 
Beispiel der Grünlandextensivierung. Contributed paper at the 44th annual conference of 
the German Agricultural Economics Society (GEWISOLA), 26-28 September 2004, 
Berlin, Germany.  
Kagel, J.H. and Roth, A.E., eds. 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton 
Univ. Press: Princeton, N.J.    26
Klemperer, P. 1999. “Auction theory: a guide to the literature.” Journal of Economic Surveys 13 
(3): 227-286.  
Klemperer, P. 2002. “What really matters in auction design.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 
(1): 169-189.  
Klemperer, P. 2004. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press. 256 pp.  
Latacz-Lohmann, U. and Van der Hamsvoort, C. 1997. “Auctioning conservation contracts: a 
theoretical analysis and an application.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 79: 407-
418. 
Larkin, S.L., Keithly, W., Adams, C.M. and Waters, J. 2004. “Buyback programs or capacity 
reduction in the U.S. shark fishery.” Agricultural and Applied Economics, 36(2): 317-332.  
Laury, S. 2002. “Enhancing and improving designs for auction mechanisms that can be used by the 
EPD for irrigation auctions.” Water Policy Working Paper #2002-012, Andrew Young School 
of Policy Studies, Georgia State University  
McAfee, R.P. and McMillan, J. 1987. “Auctions and bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature 25 
(June): 699-738.  
Milgrom, P. 1985. “Auction theory.” In Truman, B. (ed.). Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth 
World Congress, Cambridge University Press.  
Milgrom, P. 1989. “Auctions and bidding: a primer.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3): 3-22.  
Plott, C. and Smith, V.L. (forthcoming, 2008). Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK.  
Riechelderfer, K. and Boggess, J. 1988. “Government decision making and program performance: 
the case of the conservation reserve program.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
70: 1-11.  
Rothkopf, M.H. and Harstad, R.M. 1994. “Modeling competitive bidding: a critical essay.” 
Management Science 40 (3): 364-84.  
Stoneham G., Chaudri V., Ha, A. and Strappazon, L. 200). “Auctions for conservation 
contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria’s BushTender trial.” Australian Journal 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics 47 (4): 477-500.  
White, B. and Burton, M. (2005). “Measuring the efficiency of conservation auctions.” 
Contributed paper at the 49
th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society Conference, Coffs Harbour, NSW, Australia.  
Vickrey, W. 1961. “Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders.” Journal of 
Finance16: 8-37.    27
Walden, J.B., Kirkley, J.E. an Kitts, A.W. 2003. “A limited economic assessment of the northeast 
groundfish fishery buyout program.” Land Economics, 79(3): 426-39.  
Wilson, R. 1992. “Strategic Analysis of Auctions.” In Aumann, R.J. and Hart, S. (eds.). Handbook 
of Game Theory, Vol. 1: 228-79.    28
 
TABLE 1 
BC AND TC AUCTION PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO THE TWO FRP BENCHMARKS, 1
ST ROUND  
(SEE TABLE A1 IN APPENDIX  FOR UNDERLYING ABSOLUTE VALUES) 
    
Kiel BC 1 
(Budget = €3900) 
Kiel TC 1 
(Target = 29 participants)  The Kiel experiment 
Auction  MUP ACP  Auction  MUP ACP 
Applicants  (or  bidders)  100 59  70 100 67  70 
Contracts awarded   100  90  72  100  100  100 
Fixed  pay  rate  (equivalent)  100 108 139 100 124 129 
Total  payment  100  97  101 100 124 129 
Total opportunity cost   100  72  72  100  91  95 
Total N abated  100  87  77  100  96  98 
        
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
= Payment / kg N abated  100 111 131 100 129 131 
        
Information rent rate  
= Total payment / opp cost  100 135 140 100 136 136 




= Opp cost / kg N abated  100 82  94 100 94  97 
 
Perth BC 1 
(Budget = $2300) 
Perth TC 1 
(Target = 19 participants)  The Perth replicate 
Auction  MUP ACP  Auction  MUP ACP 
Applicants  (or  bidders)  100 59  74 100 73  81 
Contracts  awarded  100 84  63 100  100  100 
Fixed  pay  rate  (equivalent)  100 114 152 100 116 126 
Total  payment  100  97  101 100 116 126 
Total  opportunity  cost  100 64  65 100 90  98 
Total N abated  100  75  64  100  88  92 
        
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
= Payment / kg N abated  100 129 158 100 132 138 
        
Information rent rate  
= Total payment / opp cost  100 151 157 100 129 130 




= Opp cost / kg N abated  100  86  101 100 100 106 
 (*
) In this case, collapsed to ‘economic cost-effectiveness’ (see text).    
BC1 and TC1 : budget- and target-constrained auctions, first round  
MUP : Minimum Uniform Payment rate (absolute benchmark)  
ACP : Average Cost Payment rate 
kg N : kilograms of nitrogen (per hectare)    29
TABLE 2 
 
AUCTION PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO MUP AND ACP FOR DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(AUCTION = 100)  
      
Kiel experiment  Perth replicate  Relative auction 
performance 




Payment / kg N abated  111  131  129  158 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  135  140 151 157 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  82  94  86  101 
BC 1 
 
        
Payment / kg N abated  129  131  132  138 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  136  136 129 130 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  94  97  100  106 
TC 1 
 
        
Payment / kg N abated  98  116 106 133 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  107 115 114 124 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  91  101  93  107 
BC 3 
 
        
Payment / kg N abated  98  99 99 99 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  100 104 104 104 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  98  96  95  95 
TC 3 
 
MUP: Minimum Uniform Payment rate (absolute benchmark)  
ACP: Average Cost Payment rate 
BC and TC: budget- and target-constrained auctions, rounds 1 and 3   
In bold:   values where BC > TC  
In normal:   values where BC < TC 
In italic:   values where BC = TC  




A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF A BUDGET-CONSTRAINED 
(ABOVE) AND A TARGET-CONSTRAINED (BELOW) AUCTION VIS-À-VIS AN EQUIVALENT FIXED-
PRICE SCHEME 
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TABLE  A1 
PERFORMANCE OF BC AND TC AUCTIONS AND OF THE TWO FRP BENCHMARKS, 1
ST ROUND  
    
Kiel BC 1 
(Budget = €3900) 
Kiel TC 1 
(Target = 29 participants)  The Kiel experiment 
Auction MUP  ACP Auction MUP  ACP 
Applicants  (or  bidders)  44 26 31 43 29 30 
Contracts  awarded  29 26 21 29 29 29 
Fixed pay rate (equivalent), $/ha   133  144  185  147  182  189 
Total payment, $  3861  3737  3900  4262  5269  5481 
Total opportunity cost, $  2380  1704  1722  2573  2333  2435 
Total N abated, kg  1422  1241  1092  1459  1402  1430 
        
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
= Payment / kg N abated, $/kg  2.72 3.01 3.57 2.92 3.76 3.83 
        
Information rent rate 
= Total payment / opp cost, $/$  1.62 2.19 2.27 1.66 2.26 2.25 




= Opp cost /kg N abated, $/kg  1.67 1.37 1.58 1.76 1.66 1.70 
 
Perth BC 1 
(Budget = $2300) 
Perth TC 1 
(Target = 19 participants)  The Perth replicate 
Auction MUP  ACP Auction MUP  ACP 
Applicants  (or  bidders)  27 16 20 26 19 21 
Contracts  awarded  19 16 12 19 19 19 
Fixed pay rate (equivalent), €/ha  120  137  183  175  203  221 
Total payment, €  2274  2197  2300  3320  3857  4198 
Total opportunity cost, €  1544  991  998  2404  2162  2346 
Total N abated, kg  915  684  587  1229  1080  1128 
        
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
=Payment /kg N abated, €/kg  2.49 3.21 3.92 2.70 3.57 3.72 
        
Information rent rate 
=Total payment / opp cost, €/€  1.47 2.22 2.31 1.38 1.78 1.79 




=Opp cost /kg N abated, €/kg  1.69 1.45 1.70 2.00 2.00 2.08 
 (*
) In this case, collapsed to ‘economic cost-effectiveness’ (see text).    
FRP: Fixed Rate Payment  
BC1 and TC1 : budget- and target-constrained auctions, first round  
MUP : Minimum Uniform Payment rate (absolute benchmark)  
ACP : Average Cost Payment rate 
kg N : kilograms of nitrogen (per hectare)  
 
 